Rungwe Mtete Kujua ni Kuchagua, Mada ya Wiki, Updates

Tanzania’s Electoral Commission Bill 2023: A Step towards Independence or a Mask of Autonomy?

Overview

The National Electoral Commission Bill 2023, currently stirring up contention in Tanzania, could greatly impact the composition and autonomy of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), a critical entity for fair and free elections. Amidst rising tensions, CHADEMA, the leading opposition party, has called maandamano – a peaceful demonstration set for January 24, 2024, in Dar-es-Salaam. In addition to other vital issues, the protest aims to oppose the stated Bill, seen as merely a superficial change that contributes nothing to enhancing the NEC’s independence.1 

In an anticipated autocratic response, the government declared January 23 – 24, 2024, Dar-es-Salaam’s “cleaning day,” with various security forces in charge.2 This declaration, coinciding with CHADEMA’s demonstration, adds a new facet to the unfolding political situation. The effects of this “cleaning day” on the planned protest and CHADEMA’s subsequent reaction remain to be seen. This article will focus on the National Electoral Commission Bill 2023 and the idea of the independence of an electoral commission.

What’s the Independence of an Electoral Commission?

The independence of an electoral commission is a cornerstone in democratic societies, ensuring the fairness, transparency, and integrity of electoral processes. It refers to the commission’s ability to operate free from external influence or interference, specifically from political entities or government bodies that could compromise its impartiality. This independence is typically enshrined in a nation’s constitution or electoral laws, establishing that the commission makes autonomous decisions on critical aspects of elections, such as the registration of voters, supervision of voting, and announcement of results. However, the degree of independence can vary according to different legislative frameworks and political contexts.

The Study of the Independence of an Electoral Commission

In assessing the independence of an electoral commission, Cheeseman & Elkrit (2020) propose 3 primary factors for consideration: institutional, leadership, and financial independence.3

Institutional Independence: This dimension provides legal and statutory safeguards that protect the electoral body from undue interference. It also encompasses the commission’s autonomy in decision-making processes, including the ability to determine its procedures, rules, and conduct of elections.

Leadership Independence: To maintain impartiality, the leaders and members of the commission must be selected through a transparent, meritocratic process. They should have security of tenure to prevent arbitrary dismissals that could undermine their independence.

Financial Independence: The commission should have its budget allocated by the government and approved by Parliament. Adequate and independent financing ensures the commission is not beholden to any external entity. The funds should be disbursed timely and directly to the commission, and they should be free to allocate these resources as they see fit.

Thus, asserting the independence of an electoral commission merely through constitutional declarations is insufficient. Legal mechanisms that bolster this commission’s institutional, organizational, and financial autonomy must be established to ensure practical independence. These measures are critical to maintaining its unbiased nature and ensuring it functions without external influences or pressures.

Tanzania’s National Electoral Commission (NEC)

According to the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (1977), section 74, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) is declared independent. This is made explicit in subsections (6) and (7), where it’s stated that the NEC is responsible for supervising and coordinating elections without being obliged to comply with orders or directions from any person, government department, or political party. Furthermore, the NEC is described as an autonomous department, highlighting its independence from other governmental entities.4 Nonetheless, it’s crucial to acknowledge that while the constitution asserts the independence of the NEC, its actual execution involves three operational aspects – leadership, financial, and practical autonomy. These aspects, identified by Cheeseman & Elkrit (2020), require a law that establishes them and enforces their compliance. This balance of factors is necessary for the NEC to act independently indeed.

Constitutional and Legal Issues Affecting NEC’s Independence

The composition of the NEC raises concerns about its true independence. According to section 74 (1) of Tanzania’s Constitution (1977), the members of the NEC are appointed by the President, which could compromise their impartiality and make them susceptible to political influence. Additionally, subsection (10) of the same Constitution allows delegates to be assigned to supervise elections under the direction of the NEC, raising questions about their independence as well.

Moreover, Section 7(1) of the Elections Act stipulates that city, municipal, town, and district directors serve as returning officers (as NEC’s delegates) during elections, as per Section 74 (10) of Tanzania’s Constitution (1977).5 This provision has been a source of significant contention within Tanzania’s political scene.6 This is because it raises concerns about the independence of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), as these individuals are President’s appointed government officials who may have vested interests or biases that could influence their actions during the election process. 

One of the critical roles of the NEC is to oversee and manage the entire electoral process, including the recruitment and training of election officials. Designating government officials as returning officers creates a potential conflict of interest. These individuals may feel pressure to act in favor of the ruling party or President who appointed them. The history of past elections in Tanzania has shown a compromised impartiality and fairness. This was particularly evident in the election of 2020.7

The Recent Proposed Amendment to the NEC

Considering Cheeseman & Elkrit’s (2020) necessary factors for assessing the independence of an electoral commission, the perceived improvement in the autonomy of the NEC needs to translate into substantial, tangible changes that genuinely enhance the NEC’s independence. While Section 9 (1) of the National Electoral Commission Bill 2023 inclusion of a special recruitment committee may decentralize the appointment process, the influence of the presidency remains substantial. The Committee that maintains presidential appointees must forward a shortlist of 9 candidates to the President, who then exercises discretion to appoint a maximum of 5 commissioners.8


Additionally, the power to appoint the NEC chairperson and vice-chairperson remains a presidential prerogative. The ability to dismiss them at any time for so-called “bad behavior” casts doubt on the actual level of independence that this amendment offers. It’s worth mentioning that the Bill’s Section 8 (3) states that if the issue of removing a Commission Member arises, a Committee will be formed. However, the President also maintains the power to appoint the said Committee. This puts the security of tenure of the said members into question as the Committee may as well act as a rubberstamp of the President’s decision to dismiss a member for whatever reason the President sees fit. Accordingly, CHADEMA’s Deputy General Secretary in Mainland Tanzania, Benson Kigaila, rightly stated that the “current and proposed NEC is the presidential body that coordinates, conducts, and manages elections.”9

Wrapping up

While the NEC Bill 2023 introduces certain amendments that imply a shift towards independence for the National Electoral Commission, it fails to extricate the institution from executive influence. The seemingly decentralized appointment process, the power to appoint the NEC chairperson and vice-chairperson, and the capability to dismiss them under the pretext of “bad behavior” arguably still reflect a significant degree of presidential control. Until the NEC is completely free of such presidential prerogatives, its autonomy remains dubious at best. 

Therefore, the ruling Chama cha Mapindunzi’s (CCM) government must involve all political parties in this process and take their concerns seriously for a truly transparent and impartial election. Only then can we genuinely say that changes have been made to improve the democratic process in Tanzania. We must continue to monitor and advocate for comprehensive reforms through peaceful maandamano and other means that will lead to credible and fair elections in the country. Together, we can build a nation that embodies true democracy and respects the voices of its people.

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References

  1. Mwananchi Digital (2024). CHADEMA yaitisha maandamano kupinga muswada sheria ya uchaguzi. Accessed on 13 January 2024. 
    ↩︎
  2. Mwananchi (2024). RC Dar atangaza Januari 23 – 24 siku ya usafi. Accessed on 13 January 2024. ↩︎
  3. Cheeseman, N., & Elkrit, J. (2020). Understanding and Assessing Electoral Commission Independence: a New Framework. Accessed on 15 January 2024. ↩︎
  4. Katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania (1977). Tume ya Uchaguzi. Accessed on 18 January 2024. 
    ↩︎
  5. Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi (2015). The National Elections Act. Accessed on 18 January 2024. ↩︎
  6. Mwananchi (2023) Mahakama ya Afrika yataka mabadiliko sheria ya uchaguzi. Accessed on 18 January 2024.
    ↩︎
  7. Collord, M. (2021). Tanzania’s 2020 Election: Return of the One-Party State. Accessed on 15 January 2024. ↩︎
  8. Parliament of Tanzania (2023). Muswada wa Sheria ya Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi. Accessed on 18 January 2024. ↩︎
  9. JamiiForums (2024). Benson Kigaila: Matatizo ya Tume ya Uchaguzi Yanayojulikana hayajaguswa. Accessed on 18 January 2024. ↩︎
Rungwe Mtete Kujua ni Kuchagua, Mada ya Wiki, Updates

Muswada wa Tume ya Uchaguzi 2023: Hatua kuelekea Uhuru Wake Kamili au Mwendelezo wa Uhuru wa Mchongo?

Muhtasari

Muswada wa Sheria ya Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi 2023, unaoibua mabishano nchini Tanzania hivi sasa, unaweza kuathiri kwa kiasi kikubwa muundo na uhuru wa Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi (NEC), ambacho ni chombo muhimu katika kuwezesha uchaguzi huru na wa haki. Wakati mvutano ukiongezeka, CHADEMA, chama kikuu cha upinzani, kimetangaza maandamano ya amani ambayo yamepangwa kufanyika Januari 24, 2024, jijini Dar-es-Salaam. Pamoja na mengineyo, lengo la maandamano hayo ni kupinga Muswada tajwa hapo juu wenye kuonekana kupendekeza mabadiliko ya mapambio ambayo hayana tija katika kuimarisha uhuru wa NEC.1 

Kama ilivyo mazoea ya utoaji wa matamko ya kiimla, serikali imetangaza Januari 23 – 24, 2024, kuwa ni “siku ya usafi” jijini Dar-es-Salaam. Na zoezi hilo litasimamiwa na vikosi vya usalama.2 Tamko hili la kuzuia maandamano kwa mgongo wa “siku ya usafi” linaenda kinyume na Kifungu cha 20 (1) cha Katiba ya Tanzania (1977) inayotoa haki kwa wananchi kufanya maandamano ya amani. Pamoja na vikwazo vilivyopo, muda si mrefu tutafahamu ikiwa maandamano haya muhimu yatafanyika kama yanavyopaswa kufanyika. Makala hii inaangazia Muswada wa Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi 2023 na dhana ya uhuru wa tume ya uchaguzi.

Uhuru wa Tume ya Uchaguzi ni nini?

Uhuru wa tume ya uchaguzi ni msingi wa jamii za kidemokrasia, unaohakikisha usawa, uwazi na uadilifu wa michakato ya uchaguzi. Unahusu uwezo wa tume kufanya kazi kwa uhuru bila kushawishiwa au kuingiliwa na mamlaka nyingine, hasa taasisi za kisiasa au vyombo vya serikali ambavyo vinaweza kuathiri uwezo wake wakutoegemea upande wowote. Uhuru huu kwa kawaida hutolewa katika katiba ya nchi au sheria za uchaguzi, zinazothibitisha kwamba tume kufanya maamuzi kwa uhuru kuhusu mambo muhimu ya uchaguzi, kama vile usajili wa wapigakura, usimamizi wa upigaji kura na utangazaji wa matokeo. Hata hivyo, kiwango cha uhuru kinaweza kutofautiana kulingana na mifumo tofauti ya sheria na miktadha ya kisiasa.

Utafiti wa Uhuru wa Tume ya Uchaguzi

Katika kutathmini uhuru wa tume ya uchaguzi, Cheeseman & Elkrit (2020) wanapendekeza mambo 3 ya msingi ya kuzingatia: Uhuru wa kitaasisi, Kiuongozi na Kifedha.3

Uhuru wa Kitaasisi: Eneo hili hutoa ulinzi wa kisheria ambao hulinda chombo cha uchaguzi dhidi ya kuingiliwa kusikostahili. Pia inajumuisha uhuru wa tume katika michakato ya kufanya maamuzi, ikiwa ni pamoja na uwezo wa kuamua taratibu zake, kanuni na uendeshaji wa uchaguzi.

Uhuru wa Kiuongozi: Ili kudumisha uwezo wa kutopendelea upande wowote, viongozi na wajumbe wa tume lazima wachaguliwe kwa njia ya uwazi na yenye kuzingatia sifa. Wawe na ulinzi wa ajira zao ili kuzuia kufukuzwa kazi kiholela, jambo ambalo linaweza kudhoofisha uhuru wao katika kutekeleza majukumu yao.

Uhuru wa Kifedha: Tume inapaswa kuwa na bajeti yake iliyotengwa na serikali na kuidhinishwa na Bunge. Iwe na ufadhili wa kutosha na unaojitegemea huhakikisha kuwa haina deni wala haihitaji kulipa fadhila kwa taasisi nyingine yoyote. Fedha hizo zitolewe kwa wakati na moja kwa moja kwa tume. Pia, watendaji wa tume wawe huru kutumia rasilimali zake kwa kadri watakavyoona inafaa.

Hivyo basi, kudai kuwa tume ya uchaguzi ni huru kwa maandishi tu ya kwenye katiba haitoshi. Mifumo ya kisheria inayoimarisha uhuru wa tume husika kitaasisi, kiuongozi, na kifedha lazima iwepo ili kuhakikisha uhuru wa kiutendaji. Hatua hizi ni muhimu ili kudumisha sifa yake ya kutopendelea upande wowote na kuhakikisha inafanya kazi bila kuingiliwa au kushinikizwa.

Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi Tanzania (NEC)

Kwa mujibu wa Katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania (1977), Kifungu cha 74, Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi (NEC) inapaswa kuwa huru. Hili limefafanuliwa wazi katika vifungu vidogo vya (6) na (7), ambapo inaelezwa kuwa NEC ina jukumu la kusimamia na kuratibu uchaguzi bila kulazimika kutii amri au maelekezo kutoka kwa mtu yeyote, idara ya serikali au chama cha siasa. Aidha, NEC inaelezwa kuwa ni idara inayojitegemea, ikisisitizwa uhuru wake kutoka kwa taasisi nyingine za kiserikali. Hata hivyo, ni muhimu kukiri kwamba wakati katiba inadai kuwa NEC ni huru, utekelezaji wa majukumu yake kwa uhuru unahusisha mambo 3 (matatu), yaani uhuru wa kiuongozi, kifedha na kiutendaji. Masuala haya, kama yalivyoanishwa na Cheeseman & Elkrit (2020), yanahitaji sheria ya kuyaanzisha na kuyasimamia. Ili NEC iweze kutekeleza majukumu yake kwa uhuru wa kweli, ni muhimu kuwepo na mchanganyiko wa masuala hayo matatu.

Masuala ya Kikatiba na Kisheria Yanayoathiri Uhuru wa NEC

Muundo wa NEC unaibua mashaka kuhusu uhuru wake wa kweli kiutendaji. Kwa mujibu wa kifungu cha 74 (1) cha Katiba ya Tanzania (1977), wajumbe wa NEC wanateuliwa na Rais jambo ambalo linaweza kuathiri uwezo wao ya kutopendelea upande wowote na kuwafanya washawishike kisiasa. Pia, Kifungu kidogo cha (10) cha Katiba kinaruhusu wawakilishi kupewa jukumu la kusimamia uchaguzi chini ya uongozi wa NEC4, na hivyo kuzua maswali kuhusu uhuru wao pia.

Aidha, Kifungu cha 7(1) cha Sheria ya Uchaguzi kinataja kuwa wakurugenzi wa majiji, manispaa, miji na wilaya watakuwa wasimamizi wa uchaguzi (kama wawakilishi wa NEC) wakati wa uchaguzi, kwa mujibu wa Kifungu cha 74 (10) cha Katiba ya Tanzania (1977).5 Kifungu hiki kimekuwa chanzo cha mzozo mkubwa ndani ya ulingo wa siasa za Tanzania.6 Hii ni kwa sababu inaleta wasiwasi kuhusu uhuru wa Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi (NEC), kwa kuwa watu hao ni viongozi wa serikali walioteuliwa na Rais ambao wanaweza kuwa na maslahi au upendeleo unaoweza kuathiri utendaji wao wakati wa mchakato wa uchaguzi.

Moja ya majukumu muhimu ya NEC ni kuratibu na kusimamia mchakato mzima wa uchaguzi, ikiwa ni pamoja na kuajiri na kutoa mafunzo kwa wasimamizi wa uchaguzi. Hivyo basi, kuteua maafisa wa serikali kama wasimamizi wa uchaguzi kunazua mgongano wa kimaslahi unaoweza kutokea. Watu hawa wanaweza kuhisi shinikizo la kupendelea chama tawala au Rais aliyewateua. Historia ya chaguzi zilizopita nchini Tanzania imeonyesha kuwepo na upendeleo katika utekelezaji wa majukumu ya NEC. Hili lilidhihirika zaidi katika uchaguzi mkuu wa mwaka 2020.7

Mapendekezo ya Marekebisho ya NEC

Mambo 3 yaliyopendekezwa na Cheeseman & Elkrit (2020) ni muhimu katika kutathmini uhuru wa tume ya uchaguzi. Ili nadharia ya uhuru wa NEC iweze kuboreshwa kwa vitendo, lazima kuwe na mabadiliko makubwa ambayo yanaimarisha uhuru wake wa kitaasisi, kiuongozi, na kifedha. Ingawa Kifungu cha 9 (1) cha Muswada wa Sheria ya Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi 2023 kinachojumuisha kamati maalum ya usaili kinaweza kugatua mchakato wa uteuzi, ushawishi wa rais katika mchakato mzima wa uteuzi bado ni mkubwa. Kamati ya usaili yenye wajumbe walioteuliwa na rais lazima ipeleke orodha fupi ya wagombea 9 kwa Rais, ambaye atatumia busara zake kuteua makamishna wasiozidi wa 5.8

Aidha, mamlaka ya kuteua mwenyekiti wa NEC na makamu mwenyekiti bado ni haki ya rais. Uwezo wa kuwaondoa wakati wowote kwa kile kinachoitwa “tabia mbaya” unatia shaka juu ya kiwango halisi cha uhuru ambacho marekebisho haya yanaleta. Ni vyema kubainisha kwamba Kifungu cha 8 (3) cha Muswada huo kinasema iwapo suala la kumwondoa Mjumbe wa Tume litatokea, Kamati ya kumshauri rais kuhusu hilo itaundwa. Hata hivyo, Rais pia ana mamlaka ya kuteua Kamati hiyo. Jambo hili linahatarisha usalama wa ajira (security of tenure) za viongozi wa NEC kwani Kamati ya kumshauri rais kuhusu hatma ya ajira zao inaweza pia kuwa ni muhuri tu wa kuidhinisha uamuzi wa Rais kumfukuza kiongozi wa NEC kwa sababu yoyote ile ambayo Rais ataona inafaa. Kwa mantiki hiyo, Naibu Katibu Mkuu wa CHADEMA Tanzania Bara, Ndg. Benson Kigaila, alisema kwa usahihi kwamba “NEC ya sasa na inayopendekezwa ni chombo cha rais cha kuratibu, kuendesha, na kusimamia uchaguzi.”9 

Hitimisho

Wakati Muswada wa NEC 2023 ukileta marekebisho fulani yanayoashiria mabadiliko kuelekea uhuru wa Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi, unashindwa kuiondoa taasisi hiyo katika ushawishi mkubwa wa taasisi ya urais. Jambo hili linatoa fursa ya vyama vingine visivyo madarakani kutotendewa haki na NEC ambayo inaweza kushawishika kufanya kazi kwa utashi wa rais ambaye ni mwenyekiti na wakati mwingine mgombea wa urais kwa tiketi ya chama chake kilichopo madarakani. 

Kanuni ya tume huru ya uchaguzi haitumiki ili tu kudhibiti ushawishi wa chama tawala, yaani kwasasa Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), bali ni kinga dhidi ya uwezekano wa chama chochote cha siasa kitakachochukua madaraka. Kanuni inahakikisha kwamba NEC inafanya kazi bila upendeleo na kwamba vitendo vyake haviyumbishwi isivyostahili na taasisi ya urais au nyingine yoyote, bila kujali rangi ya kisiasa ya serikali iliyoko madarakani. Hii bila shaka inaonyesha umuhimu wa kupatikana uhuru wa kweli, badala ya wa “mchongo”, katika utendaji kazi wa NEC nchini Tanzania.

Hivyo basi, Serikali inayoongozwa na CCM haina budi kushirikisha vyama vyote vya siasa katika mchakato huu na kuzingatia madai yao kwa umakini mkubwa kwa ajili ya uchaguzi huru na wa haki. Hapo ndipo tunaweza kusema kwa dhati kwamba mabadiliko yamefanywa ili kuboresha mchakato wa kidemokrasia nchini Tanzania. Ni lazima tuendelee kufuatilia na kutetea mageuzi ya kina kwa maandamano ya amani na njia nyinginezo zitakazopelekea uchaguzi wa kuaminika na wa haki.

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Una maoni gani kuhusu makala hii?

Marejeo

  1. Mwananchi Digital (2024). CHADEMA yaitisha maandamano kupinga muswada sheria ya uchaguzi. Accessed on 13 January 2024. ↩︎
  2. Mwananchi (2024). RC Dar atangaza Januari 23 – 24 siku ya usafi. Accessed on 13 January 2024. ↩︎
  3. Cheeseman, N., & Elkrit, J. (2020). Understanding and Assessing Electoral Commission Independence: a New Framework. Accessed on 15 January 2024. ↩︎
  4. Katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania (1977). Tume ya Uchaguzi. Accessed on 18 January 2024. ↩︎
  5. Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi (2015). The National Elections Act. Accessed on 18 January 2024. ↩︎
  6. Mwananchi (2023) Mahakama ya Afrika yataka mabadiliko sheria ya uchaguzi. Accessed on 18 January 2024. ↩︎
  7. Collord, M. (2021). Tanzania’s 2020 Election: Return of the One-Party State. Accessed on 15 January 2024. ↩︎
  8. Parliament of Tanzania (2023). Muswada wa Sheria ya Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi. Accessed on 18 January 2024. ↩︎
  9. JamiiForums (2024). Benson Kigaila: Matatizo ya Tume ya Uchaguzi Yanayojulikana hayajaguswa. Accessed on 18 January 2024. ↩︎