Tanzania’s Electoral Commission Bill 2023: A Step towards Independence or a Mask of Autonomy?
Overview
The National Electoral Commission Bill 2023, currently stirring up contention in Tanzania, could greatly impact the composition and autonomy of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), a critical entity for fair and free elections. Amidst rising tensions, CHADEMA, the leading opposition party, has called maandamano – a peaceful demonstration set for January 24, 2024, in Dar-es-Salaam. In addition to other vital issues, the protest aims to oppose the stated Bill, seen as merely a superficial change that contributes nothing to enhancing the NEC’s independence.1
In an anticipated autocratic response, the government declared January 23 – 24, 2024, Dar-es-Salaam’s “cleaning day,” with various security forces in charge.2 This declaration, coinciding with CHADEMA’s demonstration, adds a new facet to the unfolding political situation. The effects of this “cleaning day” on the planned protest and CHADEMA’s subsequent reaction remain to be seen. This article will focus on the National Electoral Commission Bill 2023 and the idea of the independence of an electoral commission.
What’s the Independence of an Electoral Commission?
The independence of an electoral commission is a cornerstone in democratic societies, ensuring the fairness, transparency, and integrity of electoral processes. It refers to the commission’s ability to operate free from external influence or interference, specifically from political entities or government bodies that could compromise its impartiality. This independence is typically enshrined in a nation’s constitution or electoral laws, establishing that the commission makes autonomous decisions on critical aspects of elections, such as the registration of voters, supervision of voting, and announcement of results. However, the degree of independence can vary according to different legislative frameworks and political contexts.
The Study of the Independence of an Electoral Commission
In assessing the independence of an electoral commission, Cheeseman & Elkrit (2020) propose 3 primary factors for consideration: institutional, leadership, and financial independence.3
Institutional Independence: This dimension provides legal and statutory safeguards that protect the electoral body from undue interference. It also encompasses the commission’s autonomy in decision-making processes, including the ability to determine its procedures, rules, and conduct of elections.
Leadership Independence: To maintain impartiality, the leaders and members of the commission must be selected through a transparent, meritocratic process. They should have security of tenure to prevent arbitrary dismissals that could undermine their independence.
Financial Independence: The commission should have its budget allocated by the government and approved by Parliament. Adequate and independent financing ensures the commission is not beholden to any external entity. The funds should be disbursed timely and directly to the commission, and they should be free to allocate these resources as they see fit.
Thus, asserting the independence of an electoral commission merely through constitutional declarations is insufficient. Legal mechanisms that bolster this commission’s institutional, organizational, and financial autonomy must be established to ensure practical independence. These measures are critical to maintaining its unbiased nature and ensuring it functions without external influences or pressures.
Tanzania’s National Electoral Commission (NEC)
According to the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (1977), section 74, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) is declared independent. This is made explicit in subsections (6) and (7), where it’s stated that the NEC is responsible for supervising and coordinating elections without being obliged to comply with orders or directions from any person, government department, or political party. Furthermore, the NEC is described as an autonomous department, highlighting its independence from other governmental entities.4 Nonetheless, it’s crucial to acknowledge that while the constitution asserts the independence of the NEC, its actual execution involves three operational aspects – leadership, financial, and practical autonomy. These aspects, identified by Cheeseman & Elkrit (2020), require a law that establishes them and enforces their compliance. This balance of factors is necessary for the NEC to act independently indeed.
Constitutional and Legal Issues Affecting NEC’s Independence
The composition of the NEC raises concerns about its true independence. According to section 74 (1) of Tanzania’s Constitution (1977), the members of the NEC are appointed by the President, which could compromise their impartiality and make them susceptible to political influence. Additionally, subsection (10) of the same Constitution allows delegates to be assigned to supervise elections under the direction of the NEC, raising questions about their independence as well.
Moreover, Section 7(1) of the Elections Act stipulates that city, municipal, town, and district directors serve as returning officers (as NEC’s delegates) during elections, as per Section 74 (10) of Tanzania’s Constitution (1977).5 This provision has been a source of significant contention within Tanzania’s political scene.6 This is because it raises concerns about the independence of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), as these individuals are President’s appointed government officials who may have vested interests or biases that could influence their actions during the election process.
One of the critical roles of the NEC is to oversee and manage the entire electoral process, including the recruitment and training of election officials. Designating government officials as returning officers creates a potential conflict of interest. These individuals may feel pressure to act in favor of the ruling party or President who appointed them. The history of past elections in Tanzania has shown a compromised impartiality and fairness. This was particularly evident in the election of 2020.7
The Recent Proposed Amendment to the NEC
Considering Cheeseman & Elkrit’s (2020) necessary factors for assessing the independence of an electoral commission, the perceived improvement in the autonomy of the NEC needs to translate into substantial, tangible changes that genuinely enhance the NEC’s independence. While Section 9 (1) of the National Electoral Commission Bill 2023 inclusion of a special recruitment committee may decentralize the appointment process, the influence of the presidency remains substantial. The Committee that maintains presidential appointees must forward a shortlist of 9 candidates to the President, who then exercises discretion to appoint a maximum of 5 commissioners.8
Additionally, the power to appoint the NEC chairperson and vice-chairperson remains a presidential prerogative. The ability to dismiss them at any time for so-called “bad behavior” casts doubt on the actual level of independence that this amendment offers. It’s worth mentioning that the Bill’s Section 8 (3) states that if the issue of removing a Commission Member arises, a Committee will be formed. However, the President also maintains the power to appoint the said Committee. This puts the security of tenure of the said members into question as the Committee may as well act as a rubberstamp of the President’s decision to dismiss a member for whatever reason the President sees fit. Accordingly, CHADEMA’s Deputy General Secretary in Mainland Tanzania, Benson Kigaila, rightly stated that the “current and proposed NEC is the presidential body that coordinates, conducts, and manages elections.”9
Wrapping up
While the NEC Bill 2023 introduces certain amendments that imply a shift towards independence for the National Electoral Commission, it fails to extricate the institution from executive influence. The seemingly decentralized appointment process, the power to appoint the NEC chairperson and vice-chairperson, and the capability to dismiss them under the pretext of “bad behavior” arguably still reflect a significant degree of presidential control. Until the NEC is completely free of such presidential prerogatives, its autonomy remains dubious at best.
Therefore, the ruling Chama cha Mapindunzi’s (CCM) government must involve all political parties in this process and take their concerns seriously for a truly transparent and impartial election. Only then can we genuinely say that changes have been made to improve the democratic process in Tanzania. We must continue to monitor and advocate for comprehensive reforms through peaceful maandamano and other means that will lead to credible and fair elections in the country. Together, we can build a nation that embodies true democracy and respects the voices of its people.
***
References
- Mwananchi Digital (2024). CHADEMA yaitisha maandamano kupinga muswada sheria ya uchaguzi. Accessed on 13 January 2024.
↩︎ - Mwananchi (2024). RC Dar atangaza Januari 23 – 24 siku ya usafi. Accessed on 13 January 2024. ↩︎
- Cheeseman, N., & Elkrit, J. (2020). Understanding and Assessing Electoral Commission Independence: a New Framework. Accessed on 15 January 2024. ↩︎
- Katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania (1977). Tume ya Uchaguzi. Accessed on 18 January 2024.
↩︎ - Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi (2015). The National Elections Act. Accessed on 18 January 2024. ↩︎
- Mwananchi (2023) Mahakama ya Afrika yataka mabadiliko sheria ya uchaguzi. Accessed on 18 January 2024.
↩︎ - Collord, M. (2021). Tanzania’s 2020 Election: Return of the One-Party State. Accessed on 15 January 2024. ↩︎
- Parliament of Tanzania (2023). Muswada wa Sheria ya Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi. Accessed on 18 January 2024. ↩︎
- JamiiForums (2024). Benson Kigaila: Matatizo ya Tume ya Uchaguzi Yanayojulikana hayajaguswa. Accessed on 18 January 2024. ↩︎